The United States and Iran have been at loggerheads since the
birth of the Islamic Republic, 33 years ago, but the two nations have
never seemed as close to a major military conflict as they have since
the beginning of 2012. As we write, concerns of the US and many other
nations that Iran's nuclear program, claimed by Tehran to be solely for
peaceful purposes, is, in fact, intended to produce nuclear weapons,
seem to be coming to a boil. In November 2011, the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) provided for the first time detailed information
about Iranian "experiments" with technologies necessary to build nuclear
warheads for missiles. Iran, moreover, has continued to accumulate
uranium enriched to 20 percent U-235, the aspect of its nuclear program
of greatest concern to the international community. In February, the
IAEA confirmed Iran's announcement that it is stepping up production of
this what-could-be-stock for weapons-grade uranium, and moving
production to Fordow, a new facility that is better protected from air
attack. For its part, the international community began to tighten
political and economic pressures on Iran markedly in mid-2010 and again
in late 2011. Increasingly frequent threats of military strikes on
Iran's nuclear facilities and acts of sabotage and assassination also
ratcheted the pressures on Tehran. By the early months of 2012, these
coercive policies were beginning to yield results, and the Iranian
regime faced a deteriorating economy, an increasingly fractious domestic
political scene, and growing international isolation.
In March 2012, Tehran and Washington and its allies agreed to resume negotiations on the nuclear issue without preconditions. However, the prospects for a successful outcome are doubtful given the two sides' distrust and fundamental antagonisms. Moreover, the US and its partners have not balanced their tightening coercive policies with positive inducements to encourage Iran to reach a peaceful accommodation. In the absence of any olive branch, the broadening sanctions, accelerating pace of covert operations, and repeated threats of military attack could only be interpreted by Iranian leaders as indicators that the US and its partners have no serious interest in a negotiated solution to the nuclear program.
In this report, we review developments in the Middle East between 2010 and early 2012, and provide our personal views on how the United States can persuade Iran to negotiate limitations on its nuclear program that can hold it reliably short of a weapons capability, without instigating a new war in the Middle East. We review the status of Iran's nuclear and missile programs, the effects of sanctions and other coercive measures, the status of internal politics in Iran and the United States, and, most importantly, the populist movements that are transforming governance and alliances in North Africa and the Middle East, with particular emphasis on the continuing struggle in Syria.
In March 2012, Tehran and Washington and its allies agreed to resume negotiations on the nuclear issue without preconditions. However, the prospects for a successful outcome are doubtful given the two sides' distrust and fundamental antagonisms. Moreover, the US and its partners have not balanced their tightening coercive policies with positive inducements to encourage Iran to reach a peaceful accommodation. In the absence of any olive branch, the broadening sanctions, accelerating pace of covert operations, and repeated threats of military attack could only be interpreted by Iranian leaders as indicators that the US and its partners have no serious interest in a negotiated solution to the nuclear program.
In this report, we review developments in the Middle East between 2010 and early 2012, and provide our personal views on how the United States can persuade Iran to negotiate limitations on its nuclear program that can hold it reliably short of a weapons capability, without instigating a new war in the Middle East. We review the status of Iran's nuclear and missile programs, the effects of sanctions and other coercive measures, the status of internal politics in Iran and the United States, and, most importantly, the populist movements that are transforming governance and alliances in North Africa and the Middle East, with particular emphasis on the continuing struggle in Syria.
No comments:
Post a Comment