This report is part of a research project funded by the European Union and conducted in collaboration with the International Labour Office. The case studies in this phase of the project consider the influence of individual characteristics and broader economic conditions on the employment prospects of foreign-born workers. The second phase will evaluate the effectiveness of integration and workforce development policies in helping foreign-born workers overcome these barriers and move up into middle-skilled positions that pay a family-sustaining wage. The six case study countries are the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
Friday, June 20, 2014
Tuesday, June 17, 2014
Stable States: Rethinking social cohesion and good governance
Damien D. Cheong's (Research Fellow) contribution in this book discusses measures that can be employed by security officials to engage communities in order to enhance social cohesion. This is important particularly in countries where social, ethnic and/or religious cleavages exist, and where trust in the security apparatus from a particular community is lacking.
Immigrant Parents and Early Childhood Programs: Addressing Barriers of Literacy, Culture, and Systems Knowledge By Maki Park and Margie McHugh
Immigrant parents face significant barriers as they try to engage with their children's early educational experiences, including greatly restricted access for many due to limited English proficiency and functional literacy. Parental engagement is critical for young children's early cognitive and socioemotional development, and for their participation in programs that are designed to support early learning. Reducing the barriers to parent engagement in early childhood education and care (ECEC) programs would encourage school success, and help many young children of immigrants close the gaps in kindergarten readiness with their native peers.
Recent years have seen a rapid increase in the size and share of the U.S. young-child population with at least one immigrant parent, posing challenges to policymakers and front-line programs in the early childhood arena. These demographic changes are converging with efforts in many states to expand early childhood services and improve their quality. With one in four young children in the United States living in an immigrant family, efforts to build trust and establish meaningful two-way communication with these families is an urgent priority if system expansion efforts are to realize their purpose.
Many programs face difficulties engaging with immigrant and refugee parents who often require support building U.S. cultural and systems knowledge and in overcoming English language and literacy barriers. These difficulties have been exacerbated in recent years as adult basic education and English instruction programs, which early childhood programs such as Head Start had previously relied on to support parents in need of these skills, have been significantly reduced.
Against this backdrop, this report identifies the unique needs of newcomer parents across the range of expectations for parent skill, engagement, and leadership sought by ECEC programs, and strategies undertaken to address these needs. The study is based on field research in six states, expert interviews, a literature review, and a sociodemographic analysis.
A Work in Progress: Prospects for Upward Mobility Among New Immigrants in Germany By Nadia Granato
Recent immigrants to Germany differ significantly from their earlier counterparts: newer arrivals tend to be more highly educated, and they increasingly come from Eastern European countries rather than Germany's traditional sending countries like Turkey and former Soviet states. These new immigrants have entered the German labor market with varying degrees of success.
This report analyzes the labor market integration of newcomers to Germany, based on German Microcensus data. The report is part of a series of six case studies on labor market outcomes among immigrants to European Union countries.
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During the 2000s, new immigrants had lower average employment rates at arrival than native workers. Most immigrants had better chances of finding work the longer they stayed in Germany—although they never entirely caught up with natives. Immigrants’ employment rates largely depended on where they came from: citizens from European Union-15 countries consistently had the highest employment rates (almost as high as those of native workers), followed by Eastern Europeans. Meanwhile, immigrants from Turkey and the former Commonwealth of Independent States had the lowest rates of employment. However, these groups also showed the largest improvements over time.
The report also assesses the quality of immigrants' labor market outcomes, including their participation in temporary versus permanent employment and their ability to access jobs that correspond to their skill level. Immigrants who entered employment did not always find their way into high-quality jobs. On average, immigrant workers in Germany were between two and three times more likely than natives to occupy the lowest-skilled positions. Immigrants' progress leaving low-skilled work over time depended in part on their countries of origin and the sectors in which they worked.
Strengthening Refugee Protection and Meeting Challenges: The European Union’s Next Steps on Asylum By Madeline Garlick
While great progress has been made towards creation of a Common European Asylum System (CEAS) that establishes shared standards for refugee protection in the European Union (EU), important obstacles to its full and effective operation remain. The evolving global context of conflict and displacement, highlighted by the Syria crisis, failures by many States to protect their citizens, and mixed migration more broadly will continue to throw up new challenges in the asylum domain in the years ahead for the European Union and Member States, requiring robust systems and policies that can be adapted to meet them.
At the end of June 2014, the European Council, comprising the heads of state and government of the European Union’s 28 Member States, will adopt strategic guidelines for the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) area, including asylum. The guidelines, which will define the way forward on the JHA portfolio for the 2014-20 period, have the potential to offer clear direction for the further development of asylum policy and cooperation at the EU level. To achieve this, however, the guidelines will need to address key priorities in practical and principled terms, and accommodate widely differing perspectives among Member States, EU institutions, and other stakeholders. Looking beyond the guidelines, European policymakers will need to explore the ways in which these priorities can be translated into action. The Migration Policy Institute Europe and the International Migration Initiative of the Open Society Foundations, through their ongoing project on the future of asylum in the European Union, are examining a number of the current challenges as well as possible ways to address them.
This policy brief identifies the main issues that should be included in the strategic guidelines on asylum, and emphasises the need for a strong basis for future action. The brief recommends increased engagement by Member States in practical cooperation as a way to strengthen implementation and consolidation of existing EU laws and achieve more consistent, high-quality asylum decision-making. It further calls for a common understanding of "solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility," and concrete measures to put these key principles into practical effect; expanded resettlement to the European Union; investment in integration strategies for those granted protection; and work towards deepened cooperation and more joint approaches in the longer term, to meet the significant challenges ahead for the European Union in the asylum field.
Deterrence Stability And Escalation Control In South Asia
On December 13, 2001, extremists trained in Pakistan attacked the Indian Parliament building, triggering a crisis that almost led to war. Twelve years later, the conditions that could lead to uncontrolled escalation not only remain in effect, but have also become worse. Advancing nuclear capabilities and evolving military doctrines have far outpaced diplomacy on the subcontinent. The Stimson Center has published a collection of essays, "Deterrence Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia," edited by Michael Krepon and Julia Thompson, that clarify increased nuclear dangers and suggest ameliorative steps.
India and Pakistan have developed and flight tested seventeen new nuclear weapon delivery vehicles since testing nuclear devices in 1998 - an average of more than one per year. Military doctrines have also evolved to emphasize more rapid mobilization to engage in limited conventional warfare. Diplomacy to reduce nuclear risks has lagged far behind nuclear weapon-related advances and doctrinal change. Since 1998, Pakistan and India have negotiated four notable military-related Confidence-Building and Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures. No new measures have been agreed upon since 2007.
There is no basis for deterrence stability on the Subcontinent when diplomacy and nuclear risk reduction are moribund while nuclear capabilities grow and military doctrines evolve. The most desirable off-ramp to increased nuclear dangers is to secure normal relations with a nuclear-armed neighbor. This collection of essays - the product of bi-monthly discussions at the Stimson Center - provides analysis and ideas for deterrence stability and escalation control on the Subcontinent. This pursuit awaits leadership in India and Pakistan that is strong enough to persist in the face of violent acts designed to disrupt progress.
http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Deterrence_Stability_Dec_2013_web.pdfUN Global Focal Point For Police, Justice And Corrections
William Durch and Sofia Sebastian
The United Nations (UN) Global Focal Point on Police, Justice and Corrections (GFP) is the most recent initiative in a decade of efforts to improve the coherence and quality of the UN’s rule of law support to crisis- and conflict-affected countries. Its aim is to provide better police, justice and corrections (PJC) services from UN Headquarters to UN peacekeeping missions, special political missions and non-mission settings. Instead of establishing another institution, task force, coordination group or lead entity, the GFP innovatively focuses on creating more integrated ways of working among two key UN actors, namely the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and with the broader UN system. In this way, the GFP could be considered as a business improvement initiative, in which the two core GFP partners have each convened a portion of their resources to deliver better PJC services together to the field, while keeping the door open for other UN actors to enter their joint venture.
This report presents the results of an independent review of the progress that the GFP initiative has made since January 2012, conducted by a joint research team from the Netherlands Institute of International Relations (Clingendael), the Stimson Center and the Folke Bernadotte Academy. Based on extensive document research and more than 150 semi-structured interviews, conducted at UN Headquarters and in seven field settings, the report finds that the GFP can claim partial success, holds credible promise as an effective tool for the delivery of PJC assistance to the field, and is in need of significant improvement that will require increased support from senior UN management as well as UN Member States.
Myanmar In US-China Relations
On January 22, 2013, following the 5th US-China Asia Pacific Consultations in Beijing, the United States and China jointly announced their intention to pursue several areas of practical cooperation. For the first time in the history of their bilateral relations, Myanmar was listed as an area for future cooperation, though the suggested scope for mutual or complementary action is very modest. As stated in the announcement, “US and Chinese experts will meet to coordinate with Myanmar counterparts on an appropriate project(s), such as in the field of health, to work together for Myanmar’s stability and development.
The announcement sent several important messages. Since the beginning of Myanmar’s political reform and improvement of relations with the United States, China has felt aggrieved about the “damage” that has been inflicted on Chinese political, economic and strategic interests inside Myanmar. Many Chinese analysts perceive the “obstacles” that China has encountered in Myanmar to be largely the result of a US premeditated strategy to undermine Sino-Myanmar relations and “contain” China. Against this background, the announcement of US-China cooperation in Myanmar might be seen as an indication that the zero-sum perceptions have moderated.
However, a careful examination of the reality raises more questions and doubts than answers about such cooperation. Although China and the US share common interests in Myanmar’s stability and development, a strong sense of competition has been observed between the two powers for influence in the country, which will inevitably affect their cooperation. Given China’s perception of and grudge against the “containment” nature of US maneuvers in Myanmar, trust will be a major issue that limits the scope and depth of such cooperation. In addition, a key element of any US-China cooperation in Myanmar is the pivotal role Myanmar itself should play in the process. Whether the Myanmar government is willing or capable to play such a role remains unclear.
Key Findings:
The announcement sent several important messages. Since the beginning of Myanmar’s political reform and improvement of relations with the United States, China has felt aggrieved about the “damage” that has been inflicted on Chinese political, economic and strategic interests inside Myanmar. Many Chinese analysts perceive the “obstacles” that China has encountered in Myanmar to be largely the result of a US premeditated strategy to undermine Sino-Myanmar relations and “contain” China. Against this background, the announcement of US-China cooperation in Myanmar might be seen as an indication that the zero-sum perceptions have moderated.
However, a careful examination of the reality raises more questions and doubts than answers about such cooperation. Although China and the US share common interests in Myanmar’s stability and development, a strong sense of competition has been observed between the two powers for influence in the country, which will inevitably affect their cooperation. Given China’s perception of and grudge against the “containment” nature of US maneuvers in Myanmar, trust will be a major issue that limits the scope and depth of such cooperation. In addition, a key element of any US-China cooperation in Myanmar is the pivotal role Myanmar itself should play in the process. Whether the Myanmar government is willing or capable to play such a role remains unclear.
Key Findings:
1 - The January 2014 US-China Joint Statement on cooperation in Myanmar is an important first step in setting a new tone for how the two countries view each other’s policies and presence in the country.
2 - China has perceived new American interest in engaging Myanmar as a threat to their established role in the country, and has tended to view the dynamic in zero-sum, competitive terms.
3 - The United States, in contrast, has focused its policies in Myanmar primarily on the country’s commitment to internal reforms, and its prospects for democracy and improved human rights. While not directed at China, however, these policy priorities are seen by Beijing as harmful to its interests.
4 - The new declared interest in US-China cooperation in Myanmar does not mean a dramatic change in the near future. The content and depth of such cooperation will be difficult to work out, and some level of friction in US-China relations related to Myanmar is likely to persist.
2 - China has perceived new American interest in engaging Myanmar as a threat to their established role in the country, and has tended to view the dynamic in zero-sum, competitive terms.
3 - The United States, in contrast, has focused its policies in Myanmar primarily on the country’s commitment to internal reforms, and its prospects for democracy and improved human rights. While not directed at China, however, these policy priorities are seen by Beijing as harmful to its interests.
4 - The new declared interest in US-China cooperation in Myanmar does not mean a dramatic change in the near future. The content and depth of such cooperation will be difficult to work out, and some level of friction in US-China relations related to Myanmar is likely to persist.
This is the third of a series of four issue briefs on the changes and challenges that Myanmar faces in its domestic and foreign policies since the beginning of democratization in the nation in 2011. These briefs will explore how external factors and forces influence and shape various aspects of Myanmar’s internal development, including economic growth, ethnic conflict and national reconciliation. Previous issue briefs include “Chinese Investment in Myanmar: What Lies Ahead?” and “China, the United States and the Kachin Conflict.”
Lessons Learned For Stabilization In Syria
The Syrian conflict poses enormous challenges for US policy and for US efforts to engage with affected Syrians, including through stabilization projects. Ongoing violence in which civilians are actively targeted shows no sign of abating. As US efforts at stabilization and transition in Syria move forward in 2014, Syria’s complex conflict will continue to pose a significant set of challenges for the United States. A deeper examination of “lessons learned” from previous US experiences with conflict stabilization could provide valuable insights for Syria. Gaining deeper understanding into both successes and failures in cases including Afghanistan, Iraq and the Balkans holds particular merit. Ideally, these lessons learned should help to improve the effectiveness of stabilization and transition efforts in Syria and avoid the pitfalls of past stabilization experiences.
The newly established Center for Applied Research on Conflict (ARC) at the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) invited the Stimson Center to organize and lead the Lessons Learned for Stabilization in Syria project. Stimson established a working group comprised of experts with a broad range of expertise and skills to advise Stimson’s Syria expert Mona Yacoubian, who authored the report. Working group members encompassed a wide range of institutional and country experience, and some have worked directly on Syria-related projects funded by the US government.
The Lessons Learned for Stabilization in Syria report is not intended to review current programming for affected populations in Syria, nor to provide operational guidance or develop ideas for specific stabilization programs. It is also not intended to assess current US policy, or to devise a new “grand strategy” for Syria. Rather, the project focuses on developing critical insights from past stabilization efforts for policy makers as they contend with the daunting challenges of engaging affected populations in war-torn Syria.
Making Public-Private Security Cooperation More Efficient, Effective And Sustainable
A global economy has empowered criminals and terrorists on a global scale. The challenge of preventing illicit trafficking and other misappropriations of sensitive technology has proven too much for traditional, top-down government controls.
In this report, Stimson’s Partners in Prevention Task Force presents its final recommendations to US government and industry stakeholders for combating these threats through public-private partnerships that more effectively harness the power of decentralized, market-based incentives. These seven actionable proposals follow an 18-month Stimson collaboration with hundreds of industry partners.
With the increasing importance of the global market to US industry, finding more innovative ways for government to leverage the resources, agility and expertise of the private sector matters not only for “security,” narrowly understood. It will also go far in shaping the future of US economic competitveness and America's global influence. The Task Force proposals connect that strategic imperative with pragmatic steps forward.
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