Tuesday, January 22, 2013
Deliberations of a Working Group on Military and Diplomacy
The Indian defence establishment is confronted today with what is probably its greatest challenge since Independence. Besides being prepared to wage conventional war on possibly two fronts simultaneously, our Armed Forces need to be geared to undertake this under a nuclear overhang and within a technological environment that encompasses cyber- and space-based threats. At the same time, our forces will continue to be committed in dealing with the proxy war imposed on us, insurgencies and separatist movements, and possibly in due course, with the growing phenomenon of left wing extremism.
There is therefore an imperative requirement for change that would enable us to adapt to the emerging situation. The archaic organisations and processes put in place on achieving Independence must undergo radical overhaul.
http://idsa.in/system/files/book_MilitaryDiplomacy.pdf
Wednesday, January 2, 2013
Trans Pacific Partnership and the China-Japan-Korea Free Trade Agreement: Implications for Taiwan
Dr. Chen-Dong Tso, executive director of Center for China Studies at
the National Taiwan University and former Stimson Visiting Fellow, has
released an analysis entitled, "Trans Pacific Partnership and
China-Japan-Korea: Implications for Taiwan." In his report, Tso
examines the potential impact that the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
will have on China, China's views on how to deal with the TPP, and the
measures that China is taking to strengthen FTAs with ASEAN nations.
He also examines the recent flurry of pre-negotiation talks regarding
the China-Japan-Korea (CJK) FTA, China's reasons for pursuing it, and
the priorities and motives of Japan and Korea. More importantly, Tso
examines the potential economic impact that the TPP and CJK FTA could
have on Taiwan if they were to succeed without the Republic of China's
participation. Furthermore, he describes the major impediments to
Taiwan's participation in the TPP, including misperceptions in the
international community as well as domestic constraint. He argues that
it is in both China and Taiwan's interests for the two to join the TPP,
as it would promote greater liberalization in economic relations with
the mainland and abate protectionist policies as well as anti-Sino
sentiment in Taiwan. Ultimately, Tso notes that the TPP offers an ideal
opportunity for both sides of the cross-Strait to become economically
and politically closer.
http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/Trans_Pacific_Partnership_and_China_Japan_Korea_FTA.pdf
http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/Trans_Pacific_Partnership_and_China_Japan_Korea_FTA.pdf
Michael Krepon on Pakistan’s Nuclear Posture
The Stimson Center is releasing today an essay by Michael Krepon
on "Pakistan's Nuclear Strategy and Deterrence Stability." Krepon argues
that it will be hard to dampen the growth of Pakistan's considerable and
growing nuclear arsenal because few individuals make these decisions and most
Pakistanis view them as a rare success story.
They begrudge governmental corruption and incompetence, but not money
spent on the Bomb.
Acknowledging that the particulars of Rawalpindi's targeting objectives are closely held, the author offers the speculative conclusion that Pakistan's requirements for nuclear weapons reflect a low-, medium- and high-end mix of targeting objectives. The low option may reflect selective or demonstrative use of tactical nuclear weapons. The medium option may possibly entail widespread use of tactical nuclear weapons, although this cannot yet be determined. The high-end option may entail the destruction of critical infrastructure, leadership-related targets, and cities, with the overarching objective to deny India victory in large-scale exchanges and to destroy India as a functioning society.
A small circle of military officers determine Pakistan's stockpile and targeting requirements, including one retired officer, Lt. General Khalid Kidwai, Director-General of Pakistan's Strategic Plans Division since its inception in 2000. Gen. Kidwai's extended tenure make his views particularly influential.
This essay concludes by discussing the implications of ongoing nuclear modernization programs for deterrence stability in South Asia. Pakistani and Indian nuclear weapon programs have diversified and grown, with both countries now possessing capabilities that did not figure in previous crises, including tactical nuclear weapons and cruise missiles. In addition, sea-based nuclear capabilities appear likely. All of these developments raise new challenges for command and control.
What would it take to alter Pakistan's current growth trajectory in nuclear weapon-related capabilities? Among Krepon's list of possibilities are a different orientation toward India by Pakistan's military leaders, severe perturbations in Pakistan's economy, and a perception-shattering event that causes nuclear advocates to re-think their assumptions. He argues that the safest route to reducing nuclear dangers remains patient, persistent, top-down efforts to normalize relations between Pakistan and India. Success in this pursuit is dependent on the recognition by Pakistan's military leaders that they possess a sufficient arsenal to secure their objectives, that their current path does not strengthen or stabilize deterrence, and that Indian leaders seek a properly functioning Pakistan more than a submissive one.
Stimson's analytical and prescriptive assessments on the nuclear competition in South Asia are funded by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and by the National Nuclear Security Administration.
http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Krepon_-_Pakistan_Nuclear_Strategy_and_Deterrence_Stability.pdf
Acknowledging that the particulars of Rawalpindi's targeting objectives are closely held, the author offers the speculative conclusion that Pakistan's requirements for nuclear weapons reflect a low-, medium- and high-end mix of targeting objectives. The low option may reflect selective or demonstrative use of tactical nuclear weapons. The medium option may possibly entail widespread use of tactical nuclear weapons, although this cannot yet be determined. The high-end option may entail the destruction of critical infrastructure, leadership-related targets, and cities, with the overarching objective to deny India victory in large-scale exchanges and to destroy India as a functioning society.
A small circle of military officers determine Pakistan's stockpile and targeting requirements, including one retired officer, Lt. General Khalid Kidwai, Director-General of Pakistan's Strategic Plans Division since its inception in 2000. Gen. Kidwai's extended tenure make his views particularly influential.
This essay concludes by discussing the implications of ongoing nuclear modernization programs for deterrence stability in South Asia. Pakistani and Indian nuclear weapon programs have diversified and grown, with both countries now possessing capabilities that did not figure in previous crises, including tactical nuclear weapons and cruise missiles. In addition, sea-based nuclear capabilities appear likely. All of these developments raise new challenges for command and control.
What would it take to alter Pakistan's current growth trajectory in nuclear weapon-related capabilities? Among Krepon's list of possibilities are a different orientation toward India by Pakistan's military leaders, severe perturbations in Pakistan's economy, and a perception-shattering event that causes nuclear advocates to re-think their assumptions. He argues that the safest route to reducing nuclear dangers remains patient, persistent, top-down efforts to normalize relations between Pakistan and India. Success in this pursuit is dependent on the recognition by Pakistan's military leaders that they possess a sufficient arsenal to secure their objectives, that their current path does not strengthen or stabilize deterrence, and that Indian leaders seek a properly functioning Pakistan more than a submissive one.
Stimson's analytical and prescriptive assessments on the nuclear competition in South Asia are funded by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and by the National Nuclear Security Administration.
http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Krepon_-_Pakistan_Nuclear_Strategy_and_Deterrence_Stability.pdf
The Pentagon as Pitchman: Perception and Reality of Public Diplomacy
The Department of Defense has not institutionalized public diplomacy-like activities throughout its components, belying both hopes that it would internalize these broader concerns into its everyday activities, and fears that the Department's great scale would overwhelm all other US public diplomacy. But the evolving, post Goldwater-Nichols role of the combatant commands and SOCOM did encourage those particular organizations to develop and consolidate a program that looks very much like public diplomacy.
These conclusions have been obscured until now because of the difficulty in cataloging and costing activities within the Department of Defense that are like public diplomacy. This report is the result of a concerted effort to do so. We conclude that:
- Most of the defense activities often implicated in public diplomacy should not be. These include most of the activities the Defense Department defines as information operations, public affairs, building partnership capacity, and even most tactical military information support operations.
- Additionally, the Department of Defense has not broadly institutionalized public diplomacy-like activities despite a push to do so in the early 2000s. Institutionalization is the moving of people or resources, which has not happened.
- However, Special Operations Command and the geographic combatant commands maintain one enduring and fairly defined program that is very similar to public diplomacy activities. It includes the "Trans Regional Web and Magazine Initiatives" (TRWI and TRMI) and named "VOICE" operations.
- TRWI, TRMI, and VOICE operations were part of a $225-million budget, including war costs, in the 2012 fiscal year (FY12). That is roughly half what the State Department spends on information-based public diplomacy and just under a third of the budget for the Broadcasting Board of Governors.
- The contrast between one robust program and the lack of broader institutionalization is best explained by the varying identities, incentives, and missions of different military organizations. The military services have resisted institutionalizing public diplomacy-like activities to avoid diluting their long-standing missions, but the combatant commands, and especially SOCOM, have embraced such missions in response to their changing role in executing US foreign policy.
http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Pentagon_as_pitchman.pdf
Deliberations of a Working Group on Military and Diplomacy
The Indian defence establishment is confronted today with what is
probably its greatest challenge since Independence. Besides being
prepared to wage conventional war on possibly two fronts simultaneously,
our Armed Forces need to be geared to undertake this under a nuclear
overhang and within a technological environment that encompasses cyber-
and space-based threats. There is therefore an imperative requirement
for change that would enable us to adapt to the emerging situation. The
archaic organisations and processes put in place on achieving
Independence must undergo radical overhaul.http://www.idsa.in/system/files/book_MilitaryDiplomacy.pdf
Pakistan on the Edge
The Pakistan Project of IDSA has come up with a second report titled
Pakistan on the Edge. This Report takes into account various political
developments in Pakistan focusing more on the events of the last two
years and analyses its impact on the nation’s nascent democracy. The
Report takes a broad view of the politics, emerging political alliances,
economy, foreign policy, India-Pakistan relations and civil-military
relations. Two chapters of this report focus on Pakistan’s English and
Urdu language print media and how it looks at the critical issues of
domestic and foreign policy.http://www.idsa.in/system/files/book_Pakistanonedge.pdf
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