This case study is the first detailed account of US
crisis management after the 2008 Mumbai attacks, one that will no doubt
be amplified by future first-person accounts and the release of
additional details. We conclude that this crisis is both unresolved and
unfinished, as our title suggests, and that further attacks in India by
militants trained in Pakistan are likely. Although the circumstances,
targets, and venues of any future attacks may differ significantly, our
analysis and conclusions might help inform US planning for and
management of resultant crises between the two countries.
We hope that this case study, like our earlier
assessment of the 2001-2002 "Twin Peaks" crisis-so named because it
featured two periods of high tension sparked by militant attacks,
separated by an interval of relative calm-will be especially useful to
South Asia specialists, to readers interested in US foreign
policy-making, and to those with a particular interest in conflict
prevention. This case study is intended to complement earlier accounts
and assessments of the 2008 Mumbai attacks.
In this study, we focus especially on approaches and
mechanisms adopted by American officials after the 2008 attacks, as they
tried both to address terrorism-related issues and to steer India and
Pakistan away from confrontation. Some of these mechanisms were honed in
earlier crises between India and Pakistan, notably the reliance on
top-level diplomacy and on the choreography of high-level official US
visits to Islamabad and New Delhi with other key capitals. After the
2008 Mumbai crisis, however, information sharing and law enforcement
cooperation assumed new importance, and the Bush administration
undertook an unprecedented attempt to broker direct counterterrorism
cooperation between New Delhi and Islamabad.
http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Mumbai-Final_1.pdf
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