Immediately following the attacks of September 11, 2001, a small number of U.S.
Army Special Forces (USSF) invaded the Al Qaeda safe haven of Afghanistan. USSF Ateams,
operating with almost total independence, conducted highly successful
Unconventional Warfare “through, with, and by” the indigenous Afghan militias of the
Northern Alliance. The USSF and their indigenous Afghan armies rapidly deposed the
Taliban regime and denied the Al Qaeda terrorists their training and support areas within
Afghanistan. The momentum of the initial success achieved by USSF during 2001-2002,
however, has been dramatically overshadowed by the inability of follow-on U.S. forces
to establish long-term stability in the post-Taliban Afghanistan. Since 2002, the
conventional U.S./Coalition forces, which replaced Army USSF as the main U.S.
counter-insurgency (COIN) forces, have thus far failed to defeat the re-emerging
Taliban/Al Qaeda threat. In fact, 2005 has been the most violent year-to-date for
U.S./Coalition forces serving in Afghanistan with 239 U.S. casualties, and President
Hamid Karzai’s central Afghan government exhibiting little control outside its major
cities. This trend continues in 2006. In this thesis we question the current U.S./Coalition
campaign plan, which places emphasis on conventional military forces, not USSF, as the
main effort COIN force in Operation Enduring Freedom. We propose an alternative
Unconventional COIN model which focuses on population control instead of “clear and
sweep operations”, Afghan constabulary-style forces instead of conventional Afghan
National Army troops, the importance of “grassroots” intelligence collection at the
village level, and the employment of USSF advisors instead of conventional U.S. infantry
troops.
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA451756&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf
Army Special Forces (USSF) invaded the Al Qaeda safe haven of Afghanistan. USSF Ateams,
operating with almost total independence, conducted highly successful
Unconventional Warfare “through, with, and by” the indigenous Afghan militias of the
Northern Alliance. The USSF and their indigenous Afghan armies rapidly deposed the
Taliban regime and denied the Al Qaeda terrorists their training and support areas within
Afghanistan. The momentum of the initial success achieved by USSF during 2001-2002,
however, has been dramatically overshadowed by the inability of follow-on U.S. forces
to establish long-term stability in the post-Taliban Afghanistan. Since 2002, the
conventional U.S./Coalition forces, which replaced Army USSF as the main U.S.
counter-insurgency (COIN) forces, have thus far failed to defeat the re-emerging
Taliban/Al Qaeda threat. In fact, 2005 has been the most violent year-to-date for
U.S./Coalition forces serving in Afghanistan with 239 U.S. casualties, and President
Hamid Karzai’s central Afghan government exhibiting little control outside its major
cities. This trend continues in 2006. In this thesis we question the current U.S./Coalition
campaign plan, which places emphasis on conventional military forces, not USSF, as the
main effort COIN force in Operation Enduring Freedom. We propose an alternative
Unconventional COIN model which focuses on population control instead of “clear and
sweep operations”, Afghan constabulary-style forces instead of conventional Afghan
National Army troops, the importance of “grassroots” intelligence collection at the
village level, and the employment of USSF advisors instead of conventional U.S. infantry
troops.
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA451756&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf
Its been an unending warfare,with attacks and counter attacks.To learn more about such wars and their supporting foreign policies, visit http://unn.edu.ng/department/political-science
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